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STUDENT NOTE
transactions, it is to be expected that there will be a substantial
amount of litigation in this field in the future.
J. H. M., Jr.

CASE COMMENTS
ADMIMSTRATIVE
JRISDICTIONAL

LAw-Res Judicata-DETEmINAnTON

OF THE

FACT.-P was injured while employed by D. He

applied for and received workmen's compensation. Later he sued
under the F.E.L.A. for his injuries. D claimed that P was engaged in
intrastate commerce and therefore was not covered by the F.E.L.A.
and sought to assert the award of compensation as res judicata on
this issue. Held, on appeal, that the award of compensation was
not res judicata on the issue of the character of P's employment.
Prittv. West Virginia Northern R. R., 51 S. E.2d 105 (W.Va. 1948).
Intrastate employment is necessary to give a compensation
commissioner jurisdiction to make a valid award. Hoffman v.
N. Y., N. H. & Hartford R. R., 74 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1934), cert.
denied 294 U. S. 715 (1935). Contra:Dennisonv.Payne, 298 Fed. 333
(2d Cir. 1923). Where the character of employment is determined
by the commissioner and approved by a court the award is not
collaterally attackable for lack of jurisdiction, and the determination is res judicata. Chicago, R. I. & R. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S.
611 (1926). Where the character of employment is neither raised
nor decided the award is collaterally attackable for lack of jurisdiction, and is not res judicata. Hoffman v. N. Y., N. H. ge Hartford
R. R., supra. Where the issue of the character of employment is
raised but not passed on the award is not res judicata being collaterally attackable on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. Bretsky v.
Lehigh Valley R. R., 156 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1946). If the character
of employment is raised and determined by the commissioner the
award is res judicata and not subject to collateral attack for lack
of jurisdiction. Williams v. Southern P. Co., 54 Cal. App. 571, 202
Pac. 856 (1921), cert. denied 258 U. S. 622 (1921); see Dennison v.
Payne, supra (jurisdiction erroneously determined). When a commissioner makes an award he silently decides that he has jurisdiction; and the award is res judicata not being subject to collateral
attack for lack of jurisdiction. Landreth v. Wabash R. R., 153 F.2d
98 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied 328 U. S. 855 (1946).
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In the instant case the West Virginia court determined: (1)
that intrastate employment is necessary to give the commissioner
jurisdiction to make a valid award; and (2) this jurisdiction is
subject to collateral attack, preventing the award from being res
judicata, where it does not appear that the question of jurisdiction
was determined. An administrative determination is capable of
being res judicata. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430
(1943). This result, however, as in the instant case, has been
avoided by holding that the administrative unit lacked jurisdiction. Hoffman v. N. Y., N. H. 8 Hartford R. R., supra. This raises
the problems of the power of administrative bodies to determine
if they have jurisdiction and the effect of such a determination.
When a court decides that it has jurisdiction the degree is not
subject to collateral attack on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
the decision being res judicata of that issue. Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); Baldwin v. Iowa Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931). This "bootstrap doctrine" has
given a partial solution to the problem, for courts. Dennison v.
Payne is an application of this to administrative determination.
This doctrine is objected to on the ground that it permits the
court, or administrative body to "lift itself by its bootstraps" or
confer jurisdiction on itself. The arguments in its favor are: (1)
the question of jurisdiction must be raised at some time and an
early determination is to be favored; (2) the court or administrative tribunal of first impression is as likely to decide the issue correctly as the tribunal where the collateral attack occurs; and (3)
if the court of collateral attack erroneously determines the question
it is conferring jurisdiction where there is none. Schopflocher,
Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, [19421 Wis. L.
REv. 5, 31. The West Virginia Supreme Court did not have to pass
upon this "doctrine" in the instant case; but by dicta indicate that
it would be rejected. What was rejected was an application of the
Chicot County case doctrine to an administrative determination.
Where a court decides a case on its merits it impliedly determines
the question of jurisdiction and the decree is not subject to collateral attack for lack of jurisdiction. Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940). Essentially this
is an extension of the "bootstrap doctrine" and the arguments for
and against it are equally applicable. In addition it might be
argued that here there is nothing to indicate that the issue was
even considered or that the parties were even aware of it. However,
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the problem could have been raised by the parties and their failure
to do so should not give them a right of collateral attack. Any
attack should be limited to direct attack by appeal. See Comment,
60 HAuv. L. REv. 305 (1946). The Landreth case, supra, would
seem to be an application of this to administrative determinations.
Contra: Bretsky v. Lehigh Valley R. R., supra. See Boskey &
Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term 1939,
40 COL. L. REv. 1006, 1012 (1940); Schopflocher, supra.
In conclusion it is submitted that the West Virginia Supreme
Court in failing to apply the Chicot County case principle rejected
a sound doctrine. It is hoped that they will give a fuller consideration to the "bootstrap doctrine" as applied to administrative
determinations when the problem arises. It should also be noted
that were the problem to arise in a federal court they would give
the same effect to administrative determinations as the West
Virginia court, being bound by our rule. Hoffman v. N. Y., N. H.
& Hartford R. R., supra.
D. A. B.
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attorney in an
equity suit, administered an oath to C for the purpose of verifying
an answer. Held, on appeal, that an attorney may act as notary for
his client if his interest in the litigation goes no further than that
normally arising from the attorney-client relationship. Calhoun
County Bank v. Ellison, 54 S. E.2d 182 (W. Va. 1949). Affirmed.
The principal case presents for the first time in West Virginia
the question whether or not an attorney who is qualified to act as
a notary may take the oath of his client in making affidavits for
pleadings. In reaching its conclusion, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals stated that there is no statute or rule of court
which would disqualify A from taking C's oath. Nor does the
Canon of Ethics of the American Bar Association, nor any rule of
the West Virginia State Bar, nor the constitution or by-laws of
the West Virginia Bar Association forbid this action. The court
adopted dicta from Richardson v. Ross, 111 W. Va. 464, 163 S. E.2d
(1932), which affirms the proposition but seems to disapprove of it.
Apparently this is the view taken in a number of jurisdictions
where the practice is allowed but frowned upon. Yeagley v. Webb,
NOTARIZE CLIENT'S AFFIDAVIT.-A,
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